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dedicated judges surely make occa-
sional mistakes, but the public ex-
pects judges to avoid making system-
atic errors that favor particular
parties or writing opinions that em-
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bed these mistakes into the substan-
tive law.
Psychological research on human
judgment, however, suggests that this
expectation might be unrealistic.
This research indicates that people
some circumstances causes people to
draw systematically inaccurate infer-
ences-in other words, these heuris-
tics can create cognitive illusions of
judgment.
Just as certain patterns of visual
stimuli can fool people's eyesight,
leading them to see images that are
not really present, certain fact pat-
terns can fool people's judgment,
leading them to believe things that
are not really true. The systematic
nature of the errors that these illu-
sions produce can be analogized to
the sort of errors that an expert
marksman makes if his rifle sight is
out of alignment: his shots land in a
tight cluster, but away from the
bullseye.
Decades of research indicate that
cognitive illusions affect the way ju-
ries decide cases.2 But are judges any
better? On the one hand, judges are
illusions. On the other hand, re-
search on judgment and choice sug-
gests that cognitive illusions plague
many professionals, including doc-
tors, real-estate appraisers, engi-
neers, accountants, options traders,
military leaders, psychologists, and
even lawyers.' Systematic, controlled
studies of judicial decision making
This article is abstracted from Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNrELL L. REv. 777 (2001). The views expressed
are solely those of the authors, and not of the
Federal Judicial Center, the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts, or the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
1. See Tversky and Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124
(1974).
2. See MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury
Decision Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046 (1989).
3. See generally, Pious, THE PSYCHOLOGY Or JUDc-
MENT AND DECISION MAKING 258 (1993) (observing
that "several studies have found that experts dis-
play either roughly the same biases as college stu-
dents or the same biases at somewhat reduced
levels").
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are rare, 4 and whetherjudges are sus-
ceptible to these cognitive illusions
remains an open empirical question.
To begin to answer this question, we
conducted an empirical study to deter-
mine whether five common cognitive
4. A few studies have demonstrated the effects
of various cognitive illusions in judges: Anderson,
et. al., Evaluation ofAuditorDecisions: Hindsight Bias
Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
711, 726-727 (1993) (hindsight bias); Eisenberg,
Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy
Cases, 72 WASH U. L. Q. 979 (1994) (egocentric bi-
ases); Viscusi, How doJudges Think About Risk? 1 Am.
L. & ECON. REv. 26 (1999) (over-estimation of
small risks, hindsight bias, and ambiguity aver-
sion); Robbenolt, Punitive Damage Decision Making:
The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges, 26
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315 (2002) (various biases in
assessment of punitive damages).
illusions-anchoring, framing, hind-
sight bias, inverse fallacy, and egocen-
tric bias-would influence the decision
making of a sample of 167 federal mag-
istrate judges. We administered a brief
questionnaire to these judges during a
general educational conference spon-
sored by the Federal Judicial Center.
We found that each of these cognitive
July-August 2002
illusions influenced their decision-
making processes.
Anchoring
When people make estimates (e.g.,
the fair market value of a house),
they commonly rely on the initial
value available to them (e.g., the list
price). That initial value tends to "an-
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chor" their final estimates. Reliance
on an anchor can be reasonable be-
cause an anchor might convey rel-
evant information about the actual
value. Even anchors that do not pro-
vide any useful information, however,
can affect people's numeric esti-
mates.
For example, people asked to esti-
mate the average daytime tempera-
ture in downtown San Francisco pro-
vided higher estimates when first
asked to determine whether the cor-
rect answer was greater or less than
the absurdly high anchor of 558 de-
grees Fahrenheit.5 In litigation, an-
chors such as statutory damage caps
and plaintiffs' attorneys' requests for
damages have been shown to influ-
ence the size of damage awards even
when they convey no information
about the extent of the plaintiff's in-
jury.6
We tested for the effect of anchor-
ing on the judges in our sample by
presenting them with the following
description of a serious personal in-
jury suit in which only damages were
at issue:
Suppose that you are presiding over a
personal injury lawsuit that is in federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction. The
defendant is a major company in the
package delivery business. The plaintiff
was badly injured after being struck by
one of the defendant's trucks when its
brakes failed at a traffic light. Subsequent
investigations revealed that the braking
system on the truck was faulty, and that
the truck had not been properly main-
tained by the defendant. The plaintiff
was hospitalized for several months, and
has been in a wheelchair ever since, un-
able to use his legs. He had been earning
a good living as a free-lance electrician
and had built up a steady base of loyal
customers. The plaintiff has requested
damages for lost wages, hospitalization,
and pain and suffering, but has not speci-
fied an amount. Both parties have waived
their rights to ajury trial.
We asked half of the judges "how
much would you award the plaintiff
in compensatory damages?" We
asked the other half of the judges the
same question, but only after we first
asked them to rule on a motion filed
by the defendant to have the case dis-
missed for ostensibly failing to meet
the jurisdictional minimum in a di-
No anchor $1,249, 000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,925,000
Anchor $882,000 $288,000 $882,000 $1,000,000
versity suit ($75,000). We hypoth-
esized that the $75,000 damage
threshold mentioned in the motion
would serve as an anchor, even
though the motion was frivolous.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we
found that first ruling on the motion
had a dramatic effect on the judges'
damage awards, as shown in Table 1.
Those judges who were asked only
to determine the damage award pro-
vided an average estimate of
$1,249,000, while those judges who
first ruled on the motion provided an
average estimate of only $882,000.
Also, three-quarters of the judges
who ruled on the anchor provided
damage award estimates that were
lower than the median award pro-
vided in the no anchor condition.
Even though the motion was base-
less, it forced the judges to consider
whether the case was worth more
than $75,000. In estimating the
amount of damages to be awarded,
the judges in the anchoring condi-
tion began with $75,000 and adjusted
upward, albeit inadequately from
there.
These results are difficult to com-
pare with other anchoring studies be-
cause we used a low anchor (most
other studies use a high one) and we
used a pre-trial motion to introduce
the anchor (most studies use a dam-
age request by a plaintiff's lawyer).
That said, the results of our anchor-
ing problem-providing a low an-
chor reduced the award by 29 per-
cent-are similar to the results of the
one mock-jury study (by Malouff and
Schutte) that also involved the use of
a low anchor. Although the percent-
age reduction in mean awards by the
non-judges in that study exceeded
the one we found in judges (46 per-
cent versus 29 percent), we found a
greater mean reduction in absolute
dollars (roughly $77,000 versus
$368,000).
These results likely overstate the ef-
fect of an anchor on ajudge deciding
a real case. Our materials were neces-
sarily brief relative to an actual case
in which ajudge would have access to
much more information, probably
including conflicting numeric esti-
mates. Although the anchoring ef-
fect is real, other factors might alter
or diminish its impact in an actual
case.
Framing
When people make risky or uncer-
tain decisions-such as deciding
whether to settle a case or to proceed
to trial-they tend to categorize their
decision options as potential gains or
losses from the status quo.7 This cat-
egorization, or "framing," of decision
options influences judgment con-
cerning the wisdom of incurring risk.
People tend to prefer certainty when
choosing between options that ap-
pear to represent gains and to prefer
risk when choosing between options
that appear to represent losses. For
example, most people believe that a
certain gain of $100 is preferable to a
50 percent chance of winning $200
but believe that a 50 percent chance
of losing $200 is preferable to a cer-
tain $100 loss.
Framing can have a profound im-
pact on the assessment of civil law-
5. Plous, supra n. 3, at 146 (citing to an unpub-
lished study by Quattrone and colleagues).
6. See Chapman & Bornstein, The More You Ask
For the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury
Verdicts, 10 App. COG. PSYCHol. 519 (1996);
Malouff & Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects
of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal
Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491 (1989);
Robbenolt & Studebaker, Anchoring in the Court-
room: The bffects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23
LAw & HuM BEHAV. 353, 358-361 (1999).
7. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and
Frames, 30 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
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suits because litigation produces a
natural frame.' In most lawsuits,
plaintiffs choose either to accept a
settlement payment from the defen-
dant or to gamble that further litiga-
tion will produce a larger gain. Most
defendants, by contrast, choose ei-
ther to make a certain settlement
payment to the plaintiff or to gamble
that further litigation will reduce the
amount they must pay. Plaintiffs, in
other words, often choose between
options that appear to represent
gains, while defendants often choose
between options that appear to rep-
resent losses.9 Consequently, one
might expect there to be more pres-
sure on plaintiffs to accept settle-
ment offers than there is on defen-
dants to make settlement
offers. Framing effects
might lead ostensibly
neutral mediators, in-
cluding judges, to en-
courage plaintiffs to ac-
cept settlement offers
that are much lower
than the expected value
of the lawsuit.
To determine whether
judges' settlement rec-
ommendations might be
influenced by framing,
we presented each of the
judges with a hypothetical fact pattern
to evaluate:
Imagine that you are presiding over a
case in which a plaintiff has sued a defen-
dant for $200,000 in a copyright action.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant are
mid-sized publishing companies with an-
nual revenues of about $2.5 million per
year. They are represented by competent
attorneys who have not tried cases before
you in the past. You believe that the case
8. See Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychol-
ogy of Litigation, 70 So. CAL. L. REV. 113, 129
(1996).
9. Id. But see Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litiga-
tion: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163
(2000) (explaining that litigants' risk prefer-
ences are reversed in frivolous or low-probability
litigation).
10. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barri-
ers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Ap_
proach; 93 MIcn L. REV. 107, 128-142 (1994);
Rachlinski, supra n. 8, at 135-144.
11. See Fischhof, For Those Condemned to Study
the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (eds) JUDMENT UN-
DER UNCERTAINTY,; HEURISTICS AND BIASEs. 335,
341(1982).
is a simple one, but it presents some
tough factual questions. There is no dis-
pute as to the amount at stake, only as to
whether the defendant's actions in-
fringed on the plaintiff's copyright. You
believe that the plaintiff has a 50 percent
chance of recovering the full $200,000
and a 50 percent chance of recovering
$0. You expect that should the parties fail
to settle, each will spend approximately
$50,000 at trial in litigation expenses. As-
sume that there is no chance that the los-
ing party at trial will have to compensate
the winner for these expenses.
We then asked the judges to indi-
cate whether they thought the parties
should settle the case. Half of the
judges reviewed the case from the
plaintiff's perspective: "You have
learned that the defendant intends
Judgments that require peoph
to assess the predictability
of past outcomes are
pervasive in the law.
to offer to pay the plaintiff $60,000 to
settle the case. Do you believe that
the plaintiff should be willing to ac-
cept $60,000 to settle the case?" The
other half reviewed the case from the
defendant's perspective: "You have
learned that the plaintiff intends to
offer to accept $140,000 to settle the
case. Do you believe that the defen-
dant should be willing to pay
$140,000 to settle the case?"
In both instances, the judges were
confronted with proposed settlement
offers that exceeded the expected
judgment at trial by $10,000. Never-
theless, the plaintiff seemed to be
choosing between gains, while the
defendant seemed to be choosing be-
tween losses. We hypothesized that
the judges evaluating this case from
the plaintiff's perspective would be
more likely to recommend settle-
ment than those judges looking at it
from the defendant's perspective.
The results supported this hypoth-
esis. Among the judges evaluating
the case from the plaintiff's (gains)
perspective, 39.8 percent indicated
that they thought the plaintiff should
accept the $60,000 settlement offer,
but only 25 percent of the judges
evaluating the case from the
defendant's (losses) perspective indi-
cated that they thought the defen-
dant should pay the $140,000 settle-
ment payment proposed by plaintiff.
Although the frame of the prob-
lem influenced the judge's evalua-
tions, it had less effect on the judges
than on laypersons. The judges were
15 percentage points more inclined
to say that plaintiff rather than defen-
dant should settle, while
other studies in which
law students and under-
graduates evaluated simi-
lar materials have found
14 to 51 percentage-
point differences be-
tween subjects in the two
conditions."5
Hindsight bias
Hindsight vision is 20/
20. People overestimate
their own ability to have
predicted the past and
believe that others should have been
able to predict events better than was
possible.1' Psychologists call this ten-
dency "hindsight bias."
Few judgments in ordinary life re-
quire people to assess the predictabil-
ity of past outcomes, but such judg-
ments are pervasive in the law. For
example, determining whether a de-
fendant was negligent requires
judges and juries to evaluate the rea-
sonableness of precautions that the
defendant took against causing an
accident even though they know that
these precautions failed to prevent
injury. Precautions that seem reason-
able to people before the fact can
seem negligent after the fact.
To test whether judges are suscep-
tible to the hindsight bias, we pre-
sented each of the judges who partici-
pated in our study with a
hypothetical fact pattern based on an
actual case:
July-August 2002 Volume 86, Number I Judicature 47
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In 1991, a state prisoner filed a pro se Sec-
tion 1983 action in Federal District Court
against the Director of the Department
of Criminal Justice in his state, asserting,
among other things, that the prison had
provided him with negligent medical
treatment in violation of Section 1983.
The district court further found that the
plaintiff knew his claims were not action-
able because he had made similar claims
several years earlier in a case that had
been dismissed by the court. Thus, the
district court sanctioned the plaintiff
pursuant to Rule 11, ordering him to ob-
tain the permission of the Chief Judge in
the district before filing any more claims.
The plaintiff appealed the district court's
decision.
We randomly assigned the judges to
one of three conditions. Judges in
each condition were told that the
court of appeals had either: affirmed
the sanction; remanded the case to
the district court for imposition of a
less onerous sanction; or vacated the
sanction. We then asked all of the
judges: "In light of the facts of the
case, as described in the passage
above, which of the following possible
outcomes of the appeal was most
likely to have occurred (assume that
the three outcomes below are the only
possible ones) ?" We hypothesized that
the judges would be unable to escape
the influence of having been given
"knowledge" of the outcome when as-
sessing which outcome was most likely
to have occurred.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the
outcome significantly influenced
judges' assessments. As shown in
Table 2,judges informed of a particu-
lar outcome were much more likely
to have identified that outcome as
the most likely to have occurred.
Overall, the sum of the percentage
of judges in each of the three condi-
tions who selected the outcome that
they were provided as the "most likely
to have occurred" was 172 percent,
whereas it would have been 100 per-
cent if learning the outcome had had
no effect on the judges. Thus, the
judges exhibited susceptibility to the
hindsight bias.
Prior studies have demonstrated
that the hindsight bias affects
judges' assessments of negligence
and recklessness. 12 Our study sug-
gests that judges are also vulnerable
Affirmed 81.5 7.4 11.1
Remanded 40.4 38.6 21.1
Vacated 27.8 20.4 51.9
Note: Boldface numbers indicate the percentage of judges identifying the given outcome
as the most likely.
to the bias in procedural contexts,
such as judgments regarding:
whether Rule 11 sanctions should be
imposed (a motion or allegation can
seem more frivolous after a judicial
ruling denying it); and whether
counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance (decisions a lawyer makes in
the course of representing a client
can seem less competent after an un-
desirable outcome is obtained).
We estimate that 24 percent of the
judges in our study made a different
choice because of the hindsight bias
(172 percent minus 100 percent di-
vided by 3 conditions). This result is
comparable to data from mock-jury
studies." It is also comparable to the
estimate from a statistical review of
studies of the hindsight bias, which
indicated that the hindsight bias al-
ters the decisions of 27 percent of
decision makers.
14
Inverse fallacy
When making categorical judg-
ments, people tend to discount the
importance of background statistics,
such as the general prevalence of a
particular category. 5 In one demon-
stration of this phenomenon, medi-
cal doctors were asked to estimate
the likelihood that a patient who
had tested positive for a certain rare
disease actually had that disease."6
The doctors were told that the test
was 90 percent reliable and that the
prevalence of the disease in patients
such as the one in the example was
one in one thousand. Although the
actual likelihood is quite small, 80
percent of the doctors indicated
that it was more likely than not that
the patient had the illness. The doc-
tors found the 90 percent reliability
statistic compelling, but discounted
the importance of the prevalence of
the disease.
Psychologists have labeled the spe-
cific decision-making problem iden-
tified by the aforementioned study as
the "inverse fallacy." 7 The inverse fal-
lacy refers to the tendency to treat
the probability of a hypothesis given
the evidence (for example, the prob-
ability that a defendant was negligent
given that a plaintiff was injured) as
the same as, or close to, the probabil-
ity of the evidence given the hypoth-
esis (for example, the probability
that the plaintiff would be injured if
the defendant were negligent).
The inverse fallacy can affect the
evaluation of probabilistic evidence
in the courts. For example, DNA evi-
12. See Anderson, et. al., supra n. 4; Viscusi, su-
pra n. 4;Jennings et. al., "Outcome Foreseeability
and its Effects on Judicial Decisions" (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the authors).
13. Hastie, Schkade & Payne,JurorJudgments in
Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liabil-
ity for Puntitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
597, 606 (1999) (24 percent shift); Kamin &
Rachlinski, Ex Post (Does Not Equal) Ex Ante: Deter
mining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM.
BE-AV. 89, 98 (1995) (34 percent shift); Stallard
& Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias: Utiliz-
ing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 671, 679 (1998) (28 percent shift).
14. Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, The
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATION
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 161
(1991).
15. See Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probabil-
ity: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 430 (1972).
16. Casscells, Schoenberger & Graboy, Interpre-
tations by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results,
299 NEW ENG.J. MEDICINE 999 (1978).
17. See Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios
Should Account for Error (Even When A National Re-
search Council Report Says They Should Not), 37
JURIMETRIcsJ. 425, 432 (1997).
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dence in a criminal case can provide
the probability that a randomly se-
lected DNA sample would match the
DNA sample from the crime scene
(and it typically states this as a tiny
number). Committing the inverse
fallacy would mean inferring that the
likelihood that the defendant is inno-
cent is equivalent to the likelihood of
a random match. This inference,
however, would be incorrect, as the
probability that the defendant is in-
nocent also depends on the size of
the population that the suspect's
DNA was drawn from and the reliabil-
ity of the DNA test.
To test whether judges in our study
would commit the inverse fallacy, we
gave them a problem based loosely
on the classic English case, Byrne v.
Boadle (1863):
The plaintiff was passing by a warehouse
owned by the defendant when he was
struck by a barrel, resulting in severe in-
juries. At the time, the barrel was in the
final stages of being hoisted from the
ground and loaded into the warehouse.
The defendant's employees are not sure
how the barrel broke loose and fell, but
they agree that either the barrel was neg-
ligently secured or the rope was faulty.
Government safety inspectors conducted
an investigation of the warehouse and
determined that in this warehouse: (1)
when barrels are negligently secured,
there is a 90% chance that they will break
loose; (2) when barrels are safely se-
cured, they break loose only 1% of the
time; (3) workers negligently secure bar-
rels only 1 in 1,000 times.
We then asked the judges to assess
"how likely is it that the barrel that hit
the plaintiff fell due to the negli-
gence of one of the workers?" We
provided the judges with one of four
probability ranges to select: 0-25 per-
cent, 26-50 percent, 51-75 percent, or
76-100 percent.
When presented with a problem
like this one, most people commit
the inverse fallacy and assume the
likelihood that the defendant was
negligent is 90 percent, or at least
18. Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur, 77 MICH L. REv. 1456 (1979).
19. See, e.g., Ross & Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in
Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979) (testing for ego-
centric biases in joint activities).
20. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).
quite high. In fact, however, the ac-
tual probability that the defendant
was negligent is only 8.3 percent. We
hypothesized that most of the judges
would commit the inverse fallacy and
select the "76-100 percent" range.
The judges did relatively well on
this inverse fallacy problem: 40.9 per-
cent selected the right answer by
choosing 0-25 percent; 8.8 percent
indicated 26-50 percent; 10.1 percent
indicated 51-75 percent; and 40.3
percent indicated 76-100 percent. Al-
though more than 40 percent of the
judges analyzed this problem cor-
rectly, a comparable percentage
chose the 76-100 percent range, sug-
gesting that many of the judges com-
mitted the inverse fallacy.
To some extent, judges in this
study might have been responding to
the underlying res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine that governs cases like the one
described in our question. Under the
facts as we describe them, the plain-
tiff makes out a clear case for liability
under the doctrine. Because the law
dictates that the defendant be liable
under these circumstances, the
judges might have relied on the doc-
trine in judging probabilities. This
possibility, in fact, highlights one of
the more serious difficulties that can
arise from judicial reliance on faulty
judgments, namely, that legal doc-
trine might be based on a mistaken
inference process. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur instructs judges to
take no account of the base-rate of
negligence, thereby cementing the
inverse fallacy into important legal
precedent."
In any event, the judges in our
study were more attentive than other
experts to base-rate statistics. As
noted above, 20 percent of a group of
doctors-as compared to 40 percent
of the judges in our study-provided
a correct (or nearly correct) answer
to a question using nearly identical
probabilities.
Egocentric biases
People tend to make judgments about
themselves and their abilities that are
"egocentric" or "self-serving."1" People
routinely estimate, for example, that
they are above average on a variety of
desirable characteristics, including
health, driving, productivity, and the
likelihood that their marriage will suc-
ceed. Moreover, people overestimate
their contribution to joint activities.
Following a conversation, for ex-
ample, both parties will usually esti-
mate that they spoke more than half
the time. Similarly, when married
couples are asked to estimate the per-
centage of household tasks they per-
form, their estimates typically add up
to far more than 100 percent.
Egocentric biases are generally psy-
chologically healthy, but they can
have an unfortunate influence on the
litigation process. Due to egocentric
biases, litigants and their lawyers
might overestimate their own abili-
ties, the quality of their advocacy, and
the relative merits of their cases.
These views, in turn, are likely to un-
dermine settlement efforts, as each
side remains too optimistic about its
chances of winning at trial.
Like litigants and lawyers, judges
might also be inclined to interpret
information in self-serving or ego-
centric ways. Egocentric biases might
keep judges from maintaining an
awareness of their limitations, which
could work to the detriment of liti-
gants appearing in their courtrooms.
For example, a federal judge can
grant an interlocutory appeal only if
she is willing to concede that she has
issued a ruling on a matter of law "as
to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion."2" Thus, a
litigant seeking to persuade a judge
to grant an interlocutory appeal must
convince her that another judge
could easily disagree with her ruling.
Egocentric biases may facilitate judi-
cial self-confidence and decisiveness,
but they also might induce judges to
underestimate the likelihood they
will make mistakes when adjudicat-
ing and settling cases.
To test whether judges are prone
to egocentric biases, we asked those
participating in our study to respond
to a simple question: "United States
magistrate judges are rarely over-
turned on appeal, but it does occur.
If we were to rank all of the magis-
trate judges currently in this room ac-
cording to the rate at which their de-
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Anchoring effects Estimated damages with No difference between Anchor reduced awards Comparable
and without a low anchor conditions by 29%
Hindsight bias Percent identifying known Total percent of judges Percentage identifying Comparable
outcome as most likely identifying known outcome known outcome summed
outcome (across 3 conditions) sums to 172%
-^ - 1t~o
cisions have been overturned during
their careers, [what] would your rate
be?" We then asked the judges to
place themselves into the quartile
corresponding to their respective re-
versal rates: highest (i.e., >75 per-
cent), second-highest (>50 percent),
third-highest (>25 percent), or low-
est (lowest 25 percent).
The judges exhibited an egocentric
bias. Overall, 56.1 percent of the
judges reported that their appeal rate
placed them in the lowest quartile;
31.6 percent placed themselves in the
second-lowest quartile; 7.7 percent in
the second-highest quartile, and 4.5
percent in the highest quartile. In
other words, nearly 87.7 percent of
the judges believed that at least half of
their peers had higher reversal rates
on appeal. This pattern of results dif-
fers significantly from what one would
expect if judges were unbiased. Even
assuming that the 56.1 percent of the
judges in the lowest quartile had
never been overturned on appeal (an
unlikely possibility, but one that would
make their assessments reasonable),
the remaining distribution ofjudges is
skewed significantly towards the lower
quartiles.
The magnitude of the egocentric
bias exhibited by the judges in this
study was similar to that reported in
other studies of the bias. Judges in
our sample were comparable to auto-
mobile drivers (87.5 percent claim to
be safer than the average driver),
slightly more modest than university
faculty (94 percent claim to be better
teachers than average), and much
more modest than couples about to
be married (99 percent claim to be
less likely than the average couple to
get divorced).21
Judges are human
Judges, it seems, are human. They
appear to fall prey to the same cogni-
tive illusions that psychologists have
identified among lay persons and
other professionals. Table 3 summa-
rizes our results and compares them
to the results of studies on
nonjudicial decision makers.
Although the judges in our study
were less susceptible to framing ef-
fects and the inverse fallacy than
other decision makers faced with
similar situations, they proved to be
just as susceptible as other experts
and laypersons to the influence of
anchoring effects, the hindsight bias,
and the egocentric bias.
Overall, our results indicate that,
like the rest of us, judges use heuristics
that can produce systematic errors in
judgment. Even if judges are free
from prejudice against either litigant,
fully understand the relevant law,
know all of the relevant facts, and can
put their personal politics aside, they
might still make systematically errone-
ous decisions because of the way
they-like all human beings-think.
Unlike the rest of us, however,
judges' judgments can compromise
the quality of justice that the courts
deliver. In the law review article from
which this article was abstracted, we
have identified several things that
judges can do to minimize the effects
of cognitive illusions, including con-
sidering multiple perspectives and
seeking out decision-making meth-
ods or standards that are less likely to
be influenced by misleading heuris-
tics.22 A deeper understanding of
how people think, including an ap-
preciation of the power of heuristics,
is the first step toward crafting sound
solutions. Vi
21. See Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers? 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145-146 (1981) (driving);
Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Im-
proved? 17 NEw DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
1, 5-6 (1977) (college professors); and Baker and
Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993) (en-
gaged couples).
22. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. Rrv. 777 (2001).
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